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1863. The dissent, therefore, con-
cluded that it was no longer necessary 
to enforce sweeping suppression of 
political speech subject to the protec-
tion of the First Amendment. 
In addition to overbreadth, the dis-
sent noted that the statute discrimi-
nated in its regulation of speech. The 
dissent asserted that the plurality failed 
to inquire whether this discrimination 
was related to the pwported state inter-
est. Id. at 1864. The dissent opined 
that the State did not isolate any legiti-
mate state interest justifying the selec-
tive prohibition because the same evil 
can result from unrestricted conduct. 
Id. at 1865. 
Finally, the dissent argued that the 
plurality's opinion represents a depar-
ture from the "strict scrutiny" stan-
dard. Id. First, the Court replaced the 
requirement of a showing of "neces-
sity" with the need to show 
longstanding tradition. Id. Second, 
the Court modified the requirement of 
"narrowly drawn" by granting the State 
broad power to legislate in a prospec-
tive manner in an effort to respond to 
possible future difficulties. Id. Third, 
the dissent noted that if the State no 
longer needs to show that other expres-
sive conduct does not pose the same 
danger, it no longer has the burden of 
showing justification for the law. Id. at 
1866. The dissent thus concluded that 
the presence of campaign workers out-
side a polling place was not more than 
a minor nuisance and that there was no 
justification for suppressing their free-
dom of speech. Id. at 1866-67. 
By its ruling in Burson, the Su-
preme Court perpetuates the 
longstanding tradition of allowing a 
state to regulate the areas surrounding 
a polling facility on election day. How-
ever, because this is only a plurality 
decision, with a strong dissent, this 
ruling may represent a departure from 
this tradition. In addition, Burson v. 
Freeman is significant because it holds 
that the right to freely cast a ballot in an 
election is a fundamental right which 
justifies limiting an individual's right 
to freedom of speech. 
- Julie Buchwald 
Jacobson v. United States: ENTRAP-
MENT DEFENSE PREVAILED 
WHERE GOVERNMENT FAILED 
TO PROVE CRIMINAL PREDIS-
PosmON EXISTED BEFORE IN-
VESTIGATION INDUCED DE-
FENDANTTOBREAKTHELAW. 
In Jacobson v. United States, 112 
S. Ct. 1535 (1992), the United States 
Supreme Court held that once the de-
fense of entrapment is asserted, the 
government must establish that acrimi-
nal defendant's independent predispo-
sition to commit the crime for which he 
was arrested existed before the initia-
tion ofa government investigation into 
the matter. The Court concluded that 
as a matter of law the prosecution 
failed to generate sufficient evidence 
to support a jury verdict that the defen-
dant possessed the requisite prior crimi-
nal disposition beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
In 1984, Nebraska farmer Keith 
Jacobson ordered magazines contain-
ing photos of nude teen and preteen 
boys from an adult bookstore in Cali-
fornia. Jacobson legally received these 
publications and he maintained that he 
expected them to include pictures of 
young men, eighteen years of age or 
older. Congress subsequently passed 
the Child Protection Act of 1984, 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(1984), which made the 
receipt of sexually explicit pictures of 
children through the mail illegal. In an 
effort to enforce the new law and to 
target potential offenders, government 
officials obtained Jacobson's name 
from the mailing list of the California 
bookstore. 
Under the guise of promoting sexual 
freedom and freedom of choice, fed-
eral law enforcement agents posed as 
representatives of various lobbying 
organizations, seeking responses to 
several questionnaires and surveys in 
an attempt to determine Jacobson's 
sexual preferences and propensity to 
violate the law. From these correspon-
dences, the Government succeeded in 
eliciting an indication of his interest in 
preteen homosexual materials, but un-
covered no other evidence that Jacobson 
had intentionally possessed child por-
nography in contravention of the law. 
After continuing its mailings over a 
period of twenty-six months, the Gov-
ernment sent letters to Jacobson from 
fictitious companies which decried 
censorship and the hysteria concerning 
pornography. The letters also invited 
him to request more information about 
ordering materials depicting young 
boys engaged in various sexual activi-
ties. Iacobson responded to these cor-
respondences and received brochures 
from the bogus companies. Although 
he never received the materials he had 
ordered from the first mailing, Jacobson 
was arrested after a controlled delivery 
of his second catalogue order of a 
publication containing sexually explicit 
photographs of young males. 
Jacobson was indicted in the United 
States District Court for the District of 
Nebraska for violating the Child Pro-
tection Act. In a search of his home, 
the Government found no materials 
related to child pornography exceptthe 
two original legally ordered magazines 
and the correspondences sent by law 
enforcement agents during their inves-
tigation. At trial, Jacobson testified 
that he ordered the magazines because 
the Government had succeeded in 
arousing his curiosity. Although the 
jury was instructed on the defense of 
entrapment, Jacobson was convicted 
On appeal, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting 
en bane. affirmed the lower court's 
decision and concluded that Jacobson 
was not entrapped as a matter of law. 
The Supreme Court thereafter granted 
certiorari to review the issue ofentrap-
ment. 
The Court began its analysis by 
recognizing that the Government in its 
law enforcement capacity may afford 
an opportunity for the commission of 
an offense. Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 
1540. It may not, however, employ its 
agents to instill in an innocent person's 
mind the inclination to commit a crime, 
and then induce a criminal act in order 
to prosecute. Id. The Court concluded 
that where Government agents have 
23.2 I The Law For u m 23 
"induced an individual to break the law 
and the defense of entrapment is at 
issue .. . . the prosection must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was disposed to commit the 
criminal act prior to first being ap-
proached by Government agents." 
Jacobson, 112 S. Ct. at 1540 (citing 
United Statesv. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481 
(D.C. Cir. 1991». 
The Court next explained that in a 
situation where an individual is merely 
presented with the opportunity to com-
mit a crime, the immediate willingness 
to engage in criminal conduct gives a 
clear indication of a defendant's crimi-
nal predisposition. Id. at 1541. 
Jacobson's conviction, however, in-
volved an extended effort on the part of 
the Government, culminating in an 
arrest only after twenty-six months of 
ongoing correspondence with fictitious 
organizations. Id. Thus, the Court 
ruled that although Jacobson may have 
been predisposed to receive mail-order 
child pornography by the time of his 
arrest in 1987, the Government did not 
prove that this inclination developed 
independently ofthe investigation di-
rectedtowardJacobsonsince 1985. Id. 
The evidence produced by the Gov-
ernmentconcerning Jacobson's sexual 
propensity prior to the law enforce-
ment mail campaign was insufficient 
to support a finding of his predisposi-
tion to commit a criminal act. Id. The 
Court opined that the receipt of two 
magazines from a California bookstore, 
as the sole piece of such pre-investiga-
tive evidence, could indeed indicate 
Jacobson's desire to view sexually ori-
ented photographs. Id. This inference, 
however, merely demonstrated a cer-
tain preference to act within a broad 
range of sexual conduct, only some of 
which was criminal, and thus was not 
probative of a predisposition to engage 
in illegal activity. Id. The Court 
further acknowledged that because 
most people tend to obey the law even 
if they disagree with it, evidence of 
one's inclination to perfonn what was 
once a lawful act does not justify an 
inference of a tendency to perfonn that 
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which is now illegal. Id. at 1542. 
Similarly, the Court emphasized 
that evidence produced during the in-
vestigation failed to prove Jacobson's 
predisposition to receive child pornog-
raphy through the mail. Id The Court 
viewed his responses to the many com-
munications prior to the commission 
of the actual crime as indicative only of 
Jacobson's personal inclinations and 
interests rather than sufficing as proof 
of any criminal design on his part. Id. 
Furthennore, the Government's tactic 
in its solicitation was to suggest to 
Jacobson that viewing the prohibited 
sexually oriented materials should be 
within his constitutional privilege of 
freedom of choice. Id. The Court 
concluded that the Government ex-
erted considerable pressure on him to 
obtain the outlawed materials as a pro-
test against an encroachment on his 
constitutionally guaranteed individual 
liberties. Id. Consequently, rational 
jurors could not detennine beyond a 
reasonable doubt that, absent the pro-
tracted investigation by the Govern-
ment, Jacobson was autonomously pre-
disposed to commit the crime. Id. at 
1543. 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice 
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice 
Rhenquist, Justice Kennedy, and in 
part by Justice Scalia, maintained that 
the majority's position unnecessarily 
usurped a reasonable jury inference of 
predisposition. Id. at 1544. In the 
dissent's view, the holding redefined 
the tenn ''predisposition'' and placed a 
new requirement on law enforcement 
officials by demanding a detennina-
tion ofa "reasonable suspicion ofille-
gal activity before contacting a sus-
pect." Id.at 1544. Theminorityargued 
that the Government cannot induce a 
suspect to commit a criminal act 
through its communications until it 
actually provides the opportunity to 
engage in such illegal conduct, be-
cause until then, there can be no find-
ing of an implantation of criminal de-
sign in the mind of an innocent person. 
Id. In addition, the dissent lamented 
that the Government must now show 
not only that a suspect was predisposed 
to commit a crime before an opportu-
nity was presented, but also that such 
person was criminally predisposed 
before the Government came on the 
scene. Id. at 1545. Furthennore, Jus-
tice O'Connor reasoned that the readi-
ness with which Jacobson responded 
to the opportunity to commit the crime 
indicated that he likely would have 
broken the law if left to his own de-
vices. Id at 1543-44. 
Jacobson v. United States repre-
sents an important clarification of the 
law of entrapment because it places a 
limitation on the Government's use of 
undercover agents to enforce the law. 
The Supreme Court thus has reaffirmed 
the individual's right of freedom from 
unwarranted government intrusion by 
recognizing a level of intervention by 
law enforcement officers at which a 
finding of criminal predisposition by a 
jury is unreasonable. Jacobson will 
effectively prompt the courts to scruti-
nize more carefully law enforcement 
sting operations, and will ultimately 
provide criminal defendants with a 
heightened opportunity to argue for 
exoneration if induced to engage in 
illegal activity by government offi-
cials. 
- Scott N. Alperin 





ING REFORM ACT OF 1984. 
In Williams v. United States, 112 
S. Ct. 1112 (1992), the Supreme Court 
reviewed the Sentencing Refonn Act 
of 1984 ("Sentencing Act") in an at-
tempt to establish a national consensus 
on the scope of appellate review when 
a district court's sentence varies from 
the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion Guidelines ("Guidelines").. The 
Court held that when a lower court 
relies on both valid and invalid factors 
during sentencing, a reviewing court 
cannot affirm a sentence solely on its 
independent assessment that the dis-
